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Drug Price Divergence In Europe: Regulatory Aspects
Varied pricing strategies in the nations of the European Union may be standing in the way of a unified price structure. But the tide may be turning.
by Christine Huttin R o u nd ta bl e di sc u s si on s organized by the European Commission have addressed the issue of pharmaceutical price divergence in Europe and whether a European single market means that a drug should have the same price in the whole European community. 1 Experts concluded in particular that price divergence has many causes and reflects wide disparities in national income, different health systems, and different national pricing systems. This UpDate reviews the major regulatory sources of price divergence and the main policy issues around European drug pricing.
A common political belief exists in Europe that governments should ensure that medicines are made available to everyone. Each European Union (EU) member state has its own legislation and set of measures to reach this objective. EU actions then are limited by the member states' power to define their own priorities for managing drug budgets.
However, the European Commission's agenda is guided in part by Treaty of Rome objectives-in particular, Articles 30, 85, and 86, which raise the issue of a single market for pharmaceuticals. These objectives sparked further discussion during the roundtables on pharmaceuticals (in Frankfurt in December 1996 and 1997, and in Paris in December 1998). 2 The discussion covered (1) the conditions for a liberalization of the pharmaceutical market; (2) the implications, for health and industrial policies, of development toward a single price for pharmaceuticals; and (3) how research and development (R&D) is to be paid for. The 1998 roundtable sought to balance these issues, with a European industry favoring progressive liberalization of the pharmaceutical market. 3 Pricing remains a central topic, since governments in Europe have a strong influence over corporate strategies and the scope of competition. Member states do not have unlimited discretion in pricing and reimbursement rules. They must ensure that any rule is compatible with the general rules of the Treaty of Rome on the free movement of goods, regardless of products' origin. Moreover, they have agreed on transparency rules within the European Community. 4 However, they still have exclusive authority over drug pricing and reimbursement.
Drug Pricing Issues
With the exception of the United Kingdom, countries in Europe opt for either direct control of production prices or setting only reimbursement prices (Exhibit 1). 5 In the latter case, products are first clustered into homogeneous drug classes, then a reimbursement price set for the whole cluster becomes a reference price for the class. This choice places two groups of countries in opposition: on one side, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and (to a certain extent) Italy and Spain; and on the other side, other Western European countries. The reference-price system has spread throughout Europe (attracting lowprice countries such as Spain); its impact may evolve in the future if companies have to face larger markets under such systems. In this area, two main policy issues have emerged.
n Separating price and reimbursement. Both member states and the industry remain sharply divided on the issue of dissociating price and reimbursement. Reimbursementlimit decisions generally reflect a trade-off between financial resources and a drug's quality or contribution to health. In this respect, the reference-price system is not so different from other systems. Major concerns exist, though, about the use of classifications for reimbursement and about the grouping methods used to cluster the drugs.
Methods of classification for reimbursement purposes are far from unanimous in all member states, and grouping methods are controversial: Individual patients may respond to a drug very differently according to variations in quality, absorption, indications, chemical preparations, applications forms, and frequencies of undesirable contraindications. 6 For this and other reasons, the most recent governmental reference-price initiatives have but a limited scope of use (Spain, for instance, limits its reference-price system to fifty drugs). How innovative products are treated is yet another reimbursement issue. In countries with reference-price systems, some industry price structure prevailing at certain points in time is taken for reference; this structure may not reflect the dynamics of the pace of innovation, which partly drive pharmaceutical and biotech companies' R&D decisions. Moreover, countries also have to decide how to set the reimbursement level for new drugs. Germany has decided to exclude A European average price is calculated for new drugs. c The reference-price system has been adopted and was to begin in January 1999 for fifty drugs.
most innovative products from such groupings, while the Netherlands may include certain new drugs in existing clusters. The British system of pricing generic drugs, known as the Drug Tariff, does not cluster products but sets a reimbursement price only for similar drugs. It may seem paradoxical, from a U.S. perspective, to submit generic products to reimbursement price regulation, since in a less regulated environment use of generics is a key leverage point to increasing competition. The British introduced this scheme out of a desire to maintain fair remuneration for pharmaceutical services, especially for pharmacists not able to obtain ingredients at costs similar to those obtained by large drugstore chains. The Drug Tariff is the only case in Europe of a system in which some individual products, not groups of drugs, have a set reimbursed price. In setting reimbursement prices, the nature of competition must be accounted for. Some products may have a weighted average of prices of the top five or six generic suppliers; others may have the unique price of one manufacturer (usually, an item that just came off patent). Such a system is possible only in countries that already have a substantial generic market.
n Changes beyond the scope of regulatory frameworks. National pricing and reimbursement policies also evolve out of the scope of legislation, which may remain unchanged but provide the main sources of information used within the EU price transparency directive. Indeed, governments tend to find their own ways of managing drug expenditures. The best example is the 1994 contractual collective agreement between the pharmaceutical industry and the French Ministry of Social Affairs. This agreement aimed to introduce some flexibility into the individual price-fixing system and to allow firms to adjust their price within a certain limit and move toward regulating both price and volume rather than price alone. (Per capita consumption of drugs is very high in France, which complicates drug-policy changes.) The voluntary agreement monitors the price/ volume drug budget covered by French Social Security. Belgium appears to be moving toward a similar solution, but it is still in the approval stage.
These cases illustrate how regulation can be complemented by nonlegislative agreements to implement pricing policy changes. They also show that some European governments are more willing than others are to examine the level of drug consumption (namely, price and volume), not only price decisions.
Control Of Prescribing
In the past the European countries have focused their drug policies on direct or indirect measures on prices (the supply side). A clear trend is now emerging to use more demandside tools such as control of physicians' prescribing behavior. In this regard, European countries fall into three categories: Some have adopted physician self-regulated controls (the Netherlands, Germany, and Ireland); others have opted for strict administrative controls (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom); the rest (Denmark, Greece, and Portugal) have no clear system of physician control (Exhibit 2). Two main methods exist to control physicians' prescribing behavior: budgets or mandatory guidelines, and counseling. Budgets can remain indicative, such as in the United Kingdom or Ireland, or can be very restrictive, as in Germany. Spain and France have opted for mandatory clinical guidelines for only certain categories of products. Budgetary controls mainly seem to influence generic prescribing or the use of over-the-counter drugs, if we take the British case as an example. Counseling and physician self-regulation are more common in the Netherlands and in Denmark.
These differing forms of prescribing control aim to reduce drug spending; there is as yet no clear evidence of their impact on the quality of prescribing and thus on the quality of care received by patients in these countries. 7 
Drug Reimbursement Policies
In most European countries public plans provide universal financing and delivery of health care services. For pharmaceutical services in particular, this means that a large share of approved drugs can be listed on national formularies (either positive or negative lists) (Exhibit 3). In a country such as the United Kingdom, the National Health Service (NHS) automatically reimburses approved drugs unless they are blacklisted.
A main policy issue in Europe is that several countries shift the decisions for formularies from the national level to local authorities. This gives local entities a larger role in deciding the selection of drugs that may be reimbursed, as is the case in Spain and the United Kingdom. In such cases, the transparency rules set up in the European directive cannot be imposed easily. Moreover, some authorities are experimenting with projects that are quite different from the formulary idea: for instance, the implementation of protocols not to reimburse a drug for some kinds of uses.
Three main types of patient cost-sharing systems exist in Europe: the fixed prescription charge in the United Kingdom and Ireland; percentage of drug price, as adopted by most countries; and copayments dependent on pack size in Germany. Italy has a mixed system (government vouchers plus patient copayment), and the Netherlands uses a system of deductibles. Since most cost-sharing systems in Europe are linked to prices, any changes in the pricing of drugs will directly affect the share paid by European consumers.
Concluding Comments
The regulatory sources of price divergence, as described briefly in this UpDate, act as a barrier to a single market for pharmaceuticals in Europe. The diversity prevailing in national pricing and reimbursement systems is reinforced by the fact that some EU member states rely on decentralized administrative units. Moreover, the systems are continuously undergoing changes, many of which occur outside the scope of EU regulations, and traditional producer price controls are now joined by more comprehensive systems of regulation to manage drug expenditures.
Despite the diversity, however, the current dynamics of change toward regional integration may create the conditions needed for convergence in health care markets, particularlyfor drugs. 8 EU-level legislation is now superseding some national health regulation; a good example of this is the Decker case recently decided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 9 This case, which dealt with one member state's reimbursement of eyeglasses purchased in another member state, clearly represents the first noteworthy preemption of prevailing national Social Security legislation by Articles 30 and 36 of the European Treaty. It illustrates that positions in favor of a single market are gaining strong support in Europe.
Moreover, the coming macroconvergence of national economies in the context of the Monetary Union (the Euro currency) will lead to an even stronger need for microeconomic convergence. This in turn will put pressure to reduce the price divergence in pharmaceutical markets, as well as in other important market segments.
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